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Agricultural Involution among Lampung's Javanese?*
Jeff KINGSTON**
Transmigration programs first launched by
the Dutch in 1905 and since continued by the
Indonesian government have achieved negligible
results at considerable expense. The resettle-
ment of Javanese in less densely populated
areas throughout the archipelago under the aus-
pices of transmigration programs has done little
to relieve population pressures in Java nor led
to an improvement of the economic prospects
of either those remaining in Java or the trans-
migrants.
Lampung was the initial testing ground for
Dutch colonial transmigration programs, al-
though these efforts remained limited until the
1930s. Through government sponsored trans-
migration, both Dutch and Indonesian, the
population densities that have bedeviled policy-
makers in Java have been transplanted to Lam-
pungo Subsequent generations of Javanese liv-
ing in Lampung have found it increasingly dif-
ficult to gain access to land; too many people
are forced to scratch out a subsistence living on
land which is exhausted from overintensive cul-
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tivation.
This article focuses on the pre-World War II
antecedents of the grim conditions obtaining in
the transmigration communities and whether
they are in fact a result of the inclination of
Javanese towards recreating the pattern of agri-
cultural involution as elucidated by Clifford
Geertz with reference to rural society in Java
[Geertz 1963]. 1) Here it is argued that the
emergence of rural stagnation in the Javanese
communities is a legacy of poorly conceived
transmigration policies rather than an intrinsic
proclivity towards involutionary behaviour. The
analysis features discussion of Dutch efforts to
articulate their transmigration efforts in the
idiom of tradition and the consequences this
held for the lives of the transmigrants and their
prospects for success. The acceleration of
transmigration in the mid-1930s transplanted
Javanese population densities to Lampung that
could not be sustained on the basis of dry rice
cultivation, leading to widespread indebtedness
and a fragile economy from the outset. These
consequences were quite at odds with the noble
intentions that inspired the architects of the
Ethical Policy; transmigration was designated
as one of the three pillars of 20th century Dutch
colonial policy intended to help reverse the
1) Geertz's thesis has been used to explain the
poverty prevailing among contemporary Javanese
settlements in Lampung. See Gerd R. Zimmer-
mann [1974; 1980a; 1980b].
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apparent decline in the welfare of the Javanese.
The following discussion elucidates the manner
in which these policies were implemented and
the unintended consequences which ensued.
I Evolution of Dutch Transmigration
Policies
The Javanese Paradigm
Javanese emigration can only be successful
by establishing "little Javas" (in Lampung)
[Heijting 1939: 341]2)
Heijting, who in 1905 planned and im-
plemented the initial establishment of the
Gedong Tataan transmigrant complex in Lam-
pung, clearly articulated the strength that the
"Javanese paradigm" exerted on official thinking
regarding emigration. (To avoid confusion,
emigration, pioneer resettlement and trans-
migration are various terms used in the litera-
ture to refer to government schemes to reset-
tle Javanese on other islands in the archipela-
go.) In order to attract Javanese and keep them
happy once there, the Dutch went to great
lengths to create "little Javas" in the wilderness
of Lampung. It was with much difficulty that
the government was able to recruit pioneers in
Java, even well into the Depression, and only
the promise of a sawah, and the attendant social
status and economic benefits, could lure the
2) Heijting wrote the article in response to criticism
of just this aspect of emigration carried in the
Locomotief, a leading newspaper at the time, in
the context of an ongoing debate whether it
would be possible to support mass migration
without incurring the enormous expenses associ-
ated with introducing irrigation and wet rice cul-
tivation as prevailed in Java.
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Javanese from their traditional village
communities. 3) In recreating the Javanese land-
scape, the government allotted about 1. 5 bouw
(1 bouw= 0.709 ha.) of land per family and en-
couraged wet rice cultivation by subsidizing
irrigation. 4) The government intended that the
pioneer settlements engage in food production
and did not encourage export commodity crop
production; the Dutch image of what Javanese
villages ought to be like overshadowed what
they could be like. 5) It was the ideal type of
Javanese village, conveyed by the village elite
and embraced by the colonial officials, that de-
fined the manner in which transmigration was
implemented on the ground. 6)
Heijting, in basin~ transmigration on the
apparent village and tenure structure prevailing
in Java, reasoned that,
3) See Joachim Hurwitz [1955: 21]; Karl Pelzer
[1945: 192]. Pelzer laments the fact that such a
high proportion of the colonization budget had to
be devoted to propaganda.
4) The data on land size is somewhat misleading
and confusing. Initially the settlers rarely culti-
vated more than .5 bouw so that they could
protect it from the ravages of wild animals. As
families rapidly grew, the entire parcel was ex-
ploited and soon proved inadequate to support
the second generation. In the new colony estab-
lished in 1932, Sukadana, settlers were promised
2.5 bouws of land and were permitted, initially, to
clear up to 5 bouws if they were able. Conflicting
reports suggest that many settlers received only
about 1.5 bouws as they had in the other col-
onization settlements and by 1940 may have only
received 1 bouw. The parcels in all the colonies
did not allow for natural population increases,
leading to land scarcity and exhaustion of non-
irrigated soils.
5) See Eduard J. Burger [1927: 127-134]. Burger
discusses the imposition of Dutch concepts of
rural Java on the pioneer settlements.
6) For related discussions see Benjamin White
[1983: 21-22]; W. F. Wertheim [1975: 191].
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The unique Javanese village community spirit
must be transplanted to ensure that the vir-
tues of the Javanese farmer, which make him
peaceful, industrious and helpful to others,
will also take root in the new setting so that
when a solid Javanese settlement is estab-
lished, government subsidies (i. e. free trans-
port and premiums), can be reduced to a
minimum and it will stimulate continuing
emigration of Javanese, secure in the knowl-
edge that they can rely on provisional shel-
ter, support and advice from a Javanese com-
munity. [Heijting 1938: l107f)
Heijting's rationale for recreating "little
Javas" in Lampung remained a basic principle of
government sponsored emigration. The gov-
ernment adopted a very paternalistic attitude
towards the pioneers as reflected in the reten-
tion of de facto communal tenure, subsidy of
irrigation works to promote sawah (irrigated
wet rice) cultivation and various restrictions on
cash crop production, rice selling and wage
employment on the plantations. In addition, the
government supported a Javanese way of life by
exempting the three largest settlements from
incorporation into the local Lampung govern-
ment system. The Javanese reservations were
allowed to live according to their own adat
(customary practices especially as a source of
law) and according to their own social organiza-
tion.
The stagnating influence of government
paternalism was critiqued and blamed for many
of the problems evident in the colonies during
the mid-1920s by a graduate student, E. ].
7) This and subsequent translations are the au-
thor's.
Burger, who later was employed in the Central
Colonization Committee which was responsible
for transmigration programs. Burger argued
against Heijting's notion of transplanting
Javanese conditions to Sumatra and saw little
potential therein. 8) In his opinion, government
policies were designed to keep the Javanese
pioneers subsistence oriented and in a relatively
primitive state. The paternalistic policies, and
the small plots of land, ensured that the
Javanese would never attain a level of living
exceeding that in Java precisely because they
shielded the settlers from the invigorating in-
fluence of economic stimuli. He took issue with
Boeke's famous thesis that the problem of
Javanese communities lay in their exposure to,
and involvement in western economic struc-
tures and relations, arguing instead that the
limited involvement of Javanese conditioned by
misguided government paternalism had ensured
their fate. The problem was not that they were
involved in the capitalist economy per se, but
that they were only permitted such involvement
peripherally. Burger pointed to the positive
stimulating impact of trade in Gajoland (north-
ern Sumatra) and argued that the government
should encourage trade and cash crop cultiva-
tion among the transmigrants as a means to
break the subsistence pattern ingrained in Java
and reinforced in Lampung. The problems
plaguing the colonies reflected misguided pater-
nalistic policies that undermined the viability of
the villages they sought to protect by insulating
the Javanese from the stimulus of change.
8) The following discussion is based on E. j. Burger
[1927: 128-140].
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The Bawon System and Large Scale Coloniza-
tion 1932-1941
During the 1920s transmigration fell into dis-
favor and an air of pessimism prevailed in gov-
ernment circles about the potential of continued
emigration, primarily due to the negligible re-
sults achieved at considerable expense. Mount-
ing deficits and opposition from Sumatran
plantation recruiters after WWI (who wanted to
bring over Javanese as estate workers) led the
government to place transmigration on the back
burner. However, the severity of the Great
Depression in the early 1930s, particularly in
the crowded plantation districts of Java where
so many workers had been retrenched, led
officials to revive transmigration.
Government officials had noted that several
thousand Javanese emigrated to Lampung on
their own initiative and largely at their own
expense prior to 1932, generally friends and
relatives of already settled Javanese transmi-
grants (also referred to as colonists and
pioneers). Upon arriving they would engage in
the rice harvest and earn a share thereof under
the bawon system prevailing in Java. These
bawon shares of rice and available wage labor
opportunities enabled the new arrivals to sub-
sist until their own first crops could be har-
vested from newly cleared fields. Resident
Rookmaaker estimated that a family could earn
about 5 picots of rice from their harvest labor,
deemed enough to tide them over during the
three to four months prior to their own first
harvest.9) The beauty of this system in the
eyes of the officials lay in its financial appeal;
the costs of transmigration were almost entirely
borne by the settlers themselves.
9) See H. R. Rookmaaker [1937: 422].
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On the strength of these optimistic reports
from local officials about prospects of promoting
transmigration on the basis of the bawon sys-
tem, in 1931 the bureaucrats in Batavia dis-
patched an investigator to determine how many
of the Javanese transmigrants in Lampung
wished to take relatives from Java into their
homes and employ them as harvesters [Pelzer
1945: 202]. Of the approximately 7,000 trans-
migrant households in Lampung, little more
than 1,000 responded in the affirmative, but this
rather underwhelming response did not daunt
the bureaucracy. Indeed, the fact that less than
15% of the settlers supported the introduction
of the bawon scheme is lost among official
accounts and the general literature. The subse-
quent tidal wave of emigration into Lampung
during the 1930s is misleadingly portrayed as a
response to an overwhelming demand for, and
shortage of, harvest labor.
In the 1930s, the bawon system became
compulsory for all government sponsored trans-
migrants and was closely regulated by the colo-
nial administrators. After two years the new
settlers were obliged, in turn, to sponsor a new
wave of emigrants. It was arranged that the
bawon settlers would arrive in Lampung as
close as possible to the rice harvest (March /
April) so that they could assist in the cutting of
the padi soon after their arrival and thus entail
less government support for subsistence needs.
The established settlers had to house and vict-
ual the new arrivals during the harvest season
until they could relocate to their own parcel.
The harvesters earned shares somewhat higher
than in Java, between 1/4 and 1/8 of what they
harvested, although there is some disagree-
ment in the various reports as to what the
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proportions actually were. 10) It is agreed,
however, that each family was able to earn 5
picots (1 picol= 61. 76 kg.) of padi by the end of
the harvest. There was one functionary
assigned to every ten migrant families with
special responsibility to monitor the padi earned
by the new settlers lest they fritter it away.
Every night the bawon share had to be depo-
sited with the authorities and at the end of the
harvest season the total amount was delivered
to the family at their ultimate destination.
The incorporation of the bawon system into
government sponsored emigration of Javanese
to Lampung reflects two distinct elements of
continuity relevant to an analysis of colonial
transmigration policy: 1) the shift from sub-
sidies (1905-1911) to credit (1911-1927) and
finally to bawon (1932-1941) was a process
involving decreasing government outlays and
increasing burdens on the pioneers, and; 2) the
continuing Dutch belief that the success of
transmigration lay in closely recreating the con-
ditions prevailing on Java, i.e., the emphasis on
sawah cultivation, Javanese architectural and
spatial planning, small plots, ambtsvelden, etc.
or at least their hybrid version thereof. The
gradual process whereby the Dutch transferred
the costs of transmigration to the precariously
situated pioneer settlements proved extremely
shortsighted and onerous, accelerating the debt
cycle already wreaking havoc in the desas.
However, I will leave the issue of indebtedness
10) See MVO Rookmaaker 1937, pp.33-35 for a
detailed description of the bawon system. In this
report he suggests that the bawon share was 1/5
to 1/8 of the amount of padi a laborer had
harvested. In Rookmaaker [1937] he suggests
that the share was between 1/5 to 1/3. C. C. j.
Maassen [1937: 7] suggests that the bawon
share was between 1/4 to 1/5.
aside for the moment and focus on the bawon
system as implemented by the Dutch, presum-
ably in accord with Javanese custom. 11)
Gotong Royong
Underlaying the Dutch concept of Javanese
practices involving the particular form of gotong
royong (mutual assistance) known as bawon,
was the notion that it involved a voluntaristic,
fixed relationship based on payment in kind;
bawon was viewed by the Dutch as strictly the
share of the crop earned through harvesting. It
is significant for our analysis that bureaucracies
require a certain degree of uniformity some-
what at variance with Javanese concepts of
gotong royong and the mobilization of harvest
labor based on the bawon system. It was these
fundamental misconceptions on the part of the
Dutch about the Javanese custom of gotong
royong which undermined the economic viability
of the transmigration villages in Larnpung. As
an Indonesian social scientist has argued,
In many respects the concept "gotong ro-
jong" is far too perfected in the imagination of
those who do not directly participate in it, so
that this expression often becomes a techni-
cal term for cooperation, without regard for
the underlying motivations on the part of the
direct participants. [Rifai 1958: 2]12)
In this regard it is important to emphasize the
flexibility and variability of bawon as practiced in
11) There is an assumption in the literature that the
bawon system implemented in Lampung was in-
deed a faithful reflection of Javanese custom,
e.g., K. Pelzer [1945: 202]; J. Hurwitz [1955:
16].
12) As translated and cited in Koentjariningrat
[1961: 2].
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Java which sharply contrasted with the ideal and
rigid notion of bawon seized upon by the Dutch
bureaucrats in their efforts to reduce the gov-
ernment's share of transmigration costs.
Koentjariningrat conducted field research in
two villages of Central Java between 1958 and
1959 in an attempt to record the actual practice
of gotong royong in its many forms in order to
shed light on a cultural concept that has often
been vulgarized. He and his assistants recorded
no less than six variations of gotong royong,
each of which evinced quite different attitudes
among the participants [Koentjariningrat 1961:
17-23]. Some forms were voluntary and spon-
taneous, illustrating the general perception of
gotong royong, while others, including harvest-
ing on the basis of bawon, were carefully
gauged acts of reciprocal labor exchange. 13)
Hamlets within the village formed semi-
permanent work groups, usually based on the
proximity of landholdings rather than residence,
and contributions of labor (and harvest shares)
were strictly calculated for purposes of recipro-
cal exchange. Thus, the Dutch view of bawon
as an act in accord with the Javanese way of
doing things failed to grasp the flexibility and
variability inherent in the system. Significantly,
in the village where communal relations had
weakened considerably, Koentjariningrat noted
the absence of any gotong royong arrangements
and the prevalence of wage labor. 14) Gotong
royong harvesting arrangements were prevalent
in the more isolated village where the traditional
13) See Koentjariningrat [1961: 34, 40]. Here
Koentjariningrat describes the sixth type of
gotong royong, involving agricultural harvesting,
grodjogan.
14) Koentjariningrat indicates that it was easier to
give orders if wages were paid.
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village community was less involved in the cash
economy and had experienced less disruption.
In describing the fluidity of harvesting ar-
rangements and compensation, Koentjariningrat
[1961: 42] relates that,
The villagers are aware of which expenses
are lower at a given time - the cost of meals
for gotong rojong workers or the wages of an
agricultural laborer; and whichever of the
two systems is cheaper at that time is the
one they choose. 15)
Apparently, in Java, the specific context and the
degree of village unity determine the preva-
lence and nature of gotong royong practices.
The exchange aspect of bawon and the attend-
ant variations which characterize harvesting
relationships among villagers are featured in
Stoler's study of rural Java. Regarding the
bawon system, she explains that,
... it is cited by Javanese as the stronghold
of mutual cooperation (gotong rojong) and by
students of Javanese society as the prime
example of 'shared poverty'. However,
closer examination reveals a delicately bal-
anced set of exchange relationships which
determines both differential access and re-
turns to harvesting opportunities. [Stoler
1977: 80]
The bawon system acts to ensure reciprocal
employment opportunities and the bawon share
varied according to the amount of land owned
by the harvester's household and the social
15) These findings are corroborated by Bachtiar
Rifai's research in the province of Pati, Java
[Rifai 1958].
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proximity of the labor employing and supplying
households. Harvesters within the close net-
work of reciprocal labor exchange enjoy much
higher shares than those received by distant or
non-villagers [Stoler 1977: 81].
The key aspects missing from the Dutch
hybrid bawon and at the basis of the Javanese
concept of bawon were reciprocity and strong
communal ties. In Java, a portion of the bawon
was indeed simple payment for labor, but there
was an expectation that the amount paid out in
the form of bawon could be recouped; land
owning households would hire harvesters from
each other's families and the bawon shares in
effect balanced out. Bawon was used to mobi-
lize labor and was not predicated on a unilateral
transfer of wealth as it came to evolve in Lam-
pungo
In Lampung the social context embodied in
bawon work arrangements was wholly absent
and bawon constituted simple payment rather
than reciprocal exchange. Communal ties had
been disrupted by the uprooting of Javanese
families from their village communities and
migration to newly created desas in Lampung.
By the 1930s, when the bawon system was
implemented, even in the oldest transmigrant
villages there was a lack of communal unity and
in the new villages there was none at all
[Maassen 1937: 33; van der Leeden 1952:
179]. Moreover, between the new arrivals and
the established settlers there was no social
basis for gotong royong as practiced in Java. The
fact that the government compelled established
settlers to support new arrivals indicates that a
certain degree of staatkunde had to be substi-
tuted for the lack of gemeenschap. 16)
16) For an illuminating discussion on the ideology of
Commenting on the social background of the
Javanese colonists, the Dutch sociologist, D. H.
Burger [1957: 15], observed that,
The agricultural colonization by Javanese of
the other Indonesian islands reflected to a
high degree the influence of communal village
ties ... The people in the poor regions with
bad land appeared the least willing to emi-
grate, while those from the prosperous re-
gions were the most ready. The explanation
lies, in my opinion, in the fact that in the
richer areas a money economy, thanks to
Western plantations and the cultivation of
cash crops, was most developed. Here the
village ties were weakened and the people
were less tied to the village and therefore
less stay-at-home.
Bearing in mind Koentjariningrat's observation
that gotong royong harvesting practices were
wholly absent in the desa more exposed to the
money economy, the presence of large num-
bers of migrants from these villages must cer-
tainly have undermined the strong communal
basis necessary for bawon harvesting arrange-
ments.
Returning to the economic basis of the bawon
system, there was limited opportunity for recip-
rocal labor exchange. Once the harvest was
over the new colonist left his employer's house-
hold and relocated to a new settlement, often at
a great distance. There was no opportunity to
recoup the bawon share allotted to the harves-
ters as there was in Java. Rather than a recip-
gotong royong, the construction of tradition and
the manner through which the State articulates
its demands in the vernacular of tradition see
John Bowen [1986: 545-561].
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rocal labor exchange system based on strong
communal ties, the new bawon tradition un-
veiled in Lampung involved a strict economic
relationship with payment in kind driven at the
government's behest.
By framing the new transmigration policy in
the familiar Javanese paradigm, the Dutch drew
on a strong record of adapting Indonesian tradi-
tions to government purposes. In detailing the
rise of the contractual economy in Java during
the 19th century, Burger [1957: 11] notes that
mobilization of native labor and production was
effected through traditional hierarchical struc-
tures. 17) While the profits gained from the
Culture System attest to the effectiveness of
such a strategy, it imposed onerous burdens on
a .majority of those involved. Similarly, by
drawing on a hybrid version of Javanese con-
cepts of gotong royong, the Dutch successfully
mobilized indigenous resources, extolling the
virtues of tradition while further retreating from
the philanthropical and humanitarian impulses
embodied in the Ethical Policy. In the next
section we examine the consequences of these
transmigration policies for the Javanese settlers
as a means to explain the historical origins of
the involutionary hothouse apparent to ob-
servers today.
II Agricultural Involution Among
Lampung's Javanese?
Clifford Geertz [1963: 82, 95] has analyzed
the poverty and social organization of Javanese
villages in terms of agricultural involution,
". . . the overdriving of an established fonn in
such a way that it becomes rigid through an
17) Also see B. White [1983: 7].
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inward over elaboration of detail.... [char-
acterized by] increasing labor inputs into an
already hyperintensive productive system. "
Critics have argued that agricultural involution
is not characteristic of Java's rural economy,
maintaining that his hypothesis tends to place
relatively more weight on the characteristics of
Javanese than on colonial policies in elucidating
the reasons for stagnation and poverty. IS)
Recent research notes the replication of
poverty and stagnation in Lampung's trans-
planted communities of Javanese, suggesting
that there is an inclination among Javanese to-
wards advancing such a pattern of underde-
velopment [Zimmermann 1974; 1980a; 1980b].
It is maintained that the involutionary behavior
of the Javanese as well as their proclivity to
shared poverty explain, in large measure, the
low living standards currently evident among
the Javanese transmigrants. This cultural value
explanation, or the use of such concepts as
tools of analysis rather than objects of analysis,
has been criticized elsewhere [Kahn 1978 :
103-122]. Similarly, the historical genesis of
Javanese poverty in Java and the role of colonial
policy therein has been substantially analyzed
(e.g. [Elson 1984]). In this section, I sketch
the historical background of the Javanese trans-
migrant settlements in Lampung and changing
colonial policy relevant to an analysis of whether
involutionary behavior explains the evident
poverty and to what extent other dynamics of
rural change have been operative.
18) Geertz has generated a cottage industry of criti-
cism and launched a few careers with his fanciful
portrayal of Java's rural economy. For a sam-
pling see B. White [1983]; Alexander and Alex-
ander [1982: 597-619].
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Land
Geertz's analysis of Java pointed to the exis-
tence of a crystallized pattern of land use
wherein the vast tracts of land and irrigation
facilities used by sugar plantations limited the
amount of land available to villagers, compelling
intensification of cultivation techniques in the
wake of rapid population growth. Such a situa-
tion was not evident in Lampung where the
plantation sector remained limited during the
colonial period. Even until the 1930s, there was
still a considerable land frontier in Lampung. 19)
In what sense, then, were the transmigrant
settlements hemmed in by a crystallized pat-
tern? To what can we ascribe the involutionary
response of the Javanese in Lampung?
The pioneer settlements were established as
islands of "little Javas" in Lampung with definite
boundaries. It can be argued that the govern-
ment created a crystallized pattern by adminis-
trative fiat, allocating a limited sphere which
was soon filled to the saturation point by the
mass transmigration of the 1930s. 20) It appears,
however, at least in the pre-WWII period, no
such crystallized pattern was evident and in-
deed the strategy of survival for the second
generation of pioneers was to seek land outside
the boundaries of the pioneer settlements which
they did in great numbers. Only subsequently
did the transplanting of Java's population prob-
lems limit the room for maneuver, creating a
crystallized pattern, and this was not due to
involutionary behavior. Rather, the short term
approach of the Dutch artificially recreated ex-
treme land pressures on a par with Java inside
the transmigrant sites and forced subsequent
19) MVO Junius 1933, p. 133.
20) For a discussion supporting this view see van der
Leeden [1952: 166-167].
generations to resort to swidden culture on
lands beyond the original borders of their com-
munities.
During the 1930s there was ample room for
the settlements to expand onto adjacent areas
and pioneers had a variety of opportunities to
acquire land. When the first settlement,
Gedong Tataan, reached its saturation point in
the early 1930s, thereafter its surplus popula-
tion cleared new land in adjacent areas nomi-
nally under the jurisdiction of local Lampung
communities. By yielding a share of the harvest
to the Lampungers who inevitably materialized
claiming vague rights of ownership, the
Javanese were able to secure new lands. The
presence in 1940 of some 40 small villages of
Javanese interspersed throughout Lampung
outside of the transmigration sites further
attests to the rather less than crystallized pat-
tern in the pre-WWIl period. 21) It was also
possible for established pioneeers in older,
crowded settlements such as Gedong Tataan to
move to newer, less crowded transmigration
sites. By resettling, transmigrants could escape
the strains of overpopulation that were already
eroding the prosperity of Gedong Tataan in the
early 1930s.
The largest pre-WWII transmigrant complex,
Sukadana, was established on a government
forest reserve in 1932. The remaining forest
reserves in the vicinity offered further oppor-
tunity for Javanese squatters. The government
carefully patrolled the reserves to prevent Lam-
21) Th. M. Metz and P. C. Klomp [1940: 155].
MVO Junius 1933, appendix, indicates about 35
Javanese desas were administered within the
margastelsel and 14 desas totaling 7,567 Javanese
were independently established outside the con-
fines of the official transmigration sites.
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pungers from harvesting forest products or us-
ing the land for swidden cultivation, but
apparently looked the other way when Javanese
colonists "liberated" a portion for their own
use. 22)
The Javanese could also acquire access to
land through intermarriage with a Lampunger,
which was rather rare, or under local ada!
arrangements whereby they were adopted by a
Lampung family, primarily in consideration of
the material benefits attendant thereto. 23)
There were, thus, a variety of opportunities
and strategies for the Javanese settlers, gov-
ernment and seff-sponsored, to acquire access
to land in the pre-WWII period. It is true that
the original settlements were already replicating
the pattern of involution evident in Java, taken
in a broad and general sense to mean overinten-
sive cultivation by too many people on too little
land, but the historical, social and economic
characteristics associated with the concept of
agricultural involution developed by Geertz with
respect to Java are not borne out by the avail-
able evidence tor Lampung's Javanese com-
munities.
Ecological Transformations
There is considerable evidence that the
Dutch emphasis on recreating the Javanese par-
adigm in Lampung bore fruit with respect to
transforming the contours of Lampung into a
Javanese landscape, at least in the relatively
small area of Lampung occupied by the three
main settlement areas. In 1931, as a young
22) MVO Beeuwkes 1935, cites one case where the
government pennitted the colonists to develop
60 bouws of forest reserve in this manner.
23) Personal communication, Hilsman, University of
Lampung.
assistant in the judicial service stationed in
Lampung, W. F. Wertheim [1958/59: 186] ex-
pressed his surprise upon encountering,
Irrigated rice fields. . . stretching at our
feet, fenced off by a chain of mountains far
away. It was a typical Javanese landscape,
amidst the inhospitable Sumatran wilderness.
And it was migrants from Java who, under a
government scheme, had settled in the
Gedong Tataan area and built a new life in
accordance with the pattern of their home-
land.
Or at least, in accordance with Dutch notions
about that pattern. However, the reality of the
settlements was not wholly consistent with the
hopes of the officials.
At that time Wertheim may have been im-
pressed with the appearance of the settle-
ments, but one of his colleagues, Lampung's
Assistant Resident ZWaal, who had special re-
sponsibility for the settlements, was not de-
ceived by the breathtaking transformation
accomplished by the pioneers of Gedong Ta-
taan. He noted that many of the colonists were
deserting the transmigration sites because they
were disappointed with their limited access to
irrigation. 24) Many sought employment on the
nearby plantations or established themselves on
Lampungers' lands that had not yet been ex-
hausted by prolonged dry crop cultivation.
Apparently, the original irrigation aqueducts
constructed in Gedong Tataan were not large
enough to deliver sufficient water to all the
transmigrants and it was judged prohibitively
costly to enlarge these. 25) To Zwaal, it was
24) MVO Zwaal 1934, p. 45.
25) MVO Zwaal 1934, p. 46.
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clear that the insufficiency of irrigation was a
major problem looming on the horizon which
jeopardized the future of the settlements.
From the begirming, Dutch policymakers had
based the success of the pioneer settlements on
subsistence oriented, wet rice agriculture. 26)
When the foremost expert on Lampung,
Roelofs Broersma [1916: 146-148], suggested
that the introduction of sawah culture was an
unwise and unnecessary expense, Resident
Craandijk (1913-1919) reacted sharply and dis-
missed Broersma's reasoning as unfounded. 27)
He believed that irrigation was not only neces-
sary for the economic viability of the pioneer
settlements, but also maintained that it would
have a beneficial impact on the swidden
oriented Lampungers. If Lampungers also be-
came sawah fanners they could generate a
larger rice surplus on less land while facilitating
increased export commodity crop production.
The extent of the government's continuing
commitment to sawah based emigration is
attested to by the Fl. 5 million spent on irriga-
tion related expenses between 1905 and 1930
[Boeke 1953: 180]. With the advent of the
Depression and the accumulation of government
debt, the results of such a large investment
were not encouraging; by 1929 little more than
4,100 bouws of technically irrigated sawah were
cultivated by the Javanese settlers in
Lampung. 28) Even though there appears to
26) See Heijting [1939]. Perhaps the small size of
the transmigrants' plots was related to the popu-
lar Javanese saying that a family can be happy
with 1 bouw of sawah or 2 bouws of tegalan
[Hasselman 1914: 296].
27) MVO Craandijk 1919, p. 4.
28) Kornmissorial 4 Jan., 1928, (1929 Annual Report
of the Javanese Colonies in Lampung is bundled
in with this file.)
have been a rapid expansion in the area culti-
vated in technically irrigated sawahs during the
tenure of Resident Junius (1930-1933), there
was still only 7,000 bouws of such sawah for
32,455 colonists. 29) It was a year later in 1934
that Assistant Resident Zwaal raised his con-
cerns about the fast approaching problem of too
many pioneers and too little irrigation.
Problems with irrigation also were a stum-
bling block for the establishment of the new
Sukadana complex in 1932. In that year about
6,500 pioneers began to clear land on the for-
mer forest reserve. The government managed
to recruit 9,000 new colonists for the following
year, but abruptly had to cancel these plans
because its engineers had misjudged the diffi-
culty of providing irrigation. 30) Initially, en-
gineers believed that 30,000 bouws could be
irrigated through cheap and simple irrigation
sluices, but actually this method was feasible for
only 2,000 bouws and a prohibitively costly,
large scale project was necessary to irrigate the
remainder of the complex. 31) In 1933 and 1934
no new government sponsored migration to
Lampung occurred out of concern that adequate
irrigation was absolutely essential to the viabil-
ity of the colonies. As late as 1936, C. C. J.
Maassen of the Central Colonization Committee
lobbied for continued investment in irrigation,
29) MVO Junius 1933, p. 64. Of Gedong Tataan's
17,200 bouws, a total of 11,000 bouws was culti-
vated in sawahs, but 4,000 bouws of sawah were
rainted. The figures in Junius are somewhat
more optimistic than those in the 1932 Report of
the Central Colonization Committee (V 18 Oct.,
1932) where 6,600 bouws of the total 9,400
bouws of sawah were reported to be of the
rainted variety rather than technically irrigated.
30) MR 1333, 1932 (Sept. 24); MR 1529, 1932
(Oct. 17)
31) MR 1332, 1932
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suggesting that the success of the colonies
would be strengthened thereby and would re-
dound to the state's advantage in the fonn of
enhanced tax revenues [Maassen 1937: 40-
41].
In this context, Resident Rookmaaker's of-
ficial report in 1937 in which he rejects the need
for irrigation and advocates a stepped up pace
of transmigration based on dry field cultivation
marks a major shift in Dutch transmigration
policy.32) For Rookmaaker, it was essential that
transmigration be rapidly expanded and indeed
much of his report focuses on the numbers
migrating during his tenure; successful trans-
migration was now becoming a matter of num-
bers and cost effectiveness entailing, inter alia,
a shift from expensive and limited transmigra-
tion based on sawah cultivation to cheap, mass
transmigration based on dry field cultivation.
Successful transmigration, defined for three de-
cades as the transformation of Lampung's
wilderness into Javanese sawahs, was acquiring
a dramatically altered aspect.
Herein lies an understanding of the stagnation
apparent in the Javanese settlements in Lam-
pungo The coupling of mass transmigration
based on a bawon system with a shift from
emphasis on irrigated wet rice cultivation to dry
rice cultivation was a crippling blow. Without
large scale irrigation, the bawon system has-
32) MVO Rookmaaker 1937; C. B. van der Leeden
[1952: 184-188] traces the discussion about the
feasibility of dry field cultivation as the basis of
emigration as far back as the Volksraad debates
of 1932. Actually within the Central Colonization
Committee this issue had been raised as early as
1930 (MR 1274, 1930). However, Rookmaaker
was the first to vigorously promote and imple-
ment this radical change in government trans-
migration policy.
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tened indebtedness while the ecological basis
which supported high population densities in
Java was insufficiently developed.
For Resident Rookmaaker, the world and
values of the Ethici that had originally launched
transmigration must have seemed alien indeed.
The final break with Ethical Policies could not
have been more dramatic under Rookmaaker's
tenure (1933-1937). In this period transmigra-
tion was run on the basis of "niets voor niets"
(nothing for nothing), a policy designed to tap
the resourcefulness of the Javanese, con-
ditioned as they were in the scramble to make
ends meet. Irrigation cost time and money
where speed was essential and rapid, mass
transmigration would never be possible if the
government insisted on establishing sufficient
irrigation. 33) Declining soil fertility due to inten-
sive dry crop cultivation was not problematic
for,
With the decline in fertility comes an increase
in the Javanese resourcefulness and more
intensive cultivation, inspired by their experi-
ence in Java. 34)
Thus, mass migration on the bawon model,
based on dry rice cultivation, was the govern-
ment's recipe for involution. Even areas with
no irrigation potential, in the jungle and in ex-
hausted soils covered by alang-alang grass
were deemed suitable for transmigration. In
Rookaaker's view if the land became exhausted,
there was plenty more at hand and the colonists
could resettle elsewhere. 35)
What was important, above all, was the scale
33) MVO Rookmaaker 1937, p. 19.
34) MVO Rookmaaker 1937, p. 22.
35) MVO Rookmaaker 1937, p. 88. For a discussion /'
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of transmigration and the reduction of Java's
population by as much as possible, albeit offer-
ing no solution. It is perhaps indicative of
Rookmaaker's line of thinking when he rumi-
nated that Lampung with only 390,000 inhab-
itants was approximately the same size as cen-
tral Java with 12 million inhabitants. 36) How-
ever, the government was not in a position to
underwrite construction of sufficient irrigation
to support such a high population density in
Lampung.
The short term view adopted by Rookmaaker
held disastrous ecological consequences for
Lampung. Although irrigation expenditure
figures are not available for 1933-1937, the
limited expansion in sawah area suggests that
not much money was allocated to irrigation
during Resident Rookmaaker's tenure when
48,000 Javanese were resettled in Lampung.
Fortunately, the government did continue
irrigation efforts, but these were not entirely
successful and not in proportion to the numbers
of Javanese resettled between 1937-1940.
While the government spent F1.6 million be-
tween 1938-1940 on irrigation in Lampung,
only slightly more than the total it had spent in
the first twenty-five years of transmigration, it
also relocated three times as many Javanese to
Lampung in these three years than in the entire
pre-Depression era. 37) By 1940, with a popula-
tion of 47,000, Sukadana only had 5-6,000 ha.
of sawah, a much less favorable ratio than
'\i of the dire ecological consequences of such an
approach see Pelzer [1968: 269-79].
36) MVO Rookmaaker 1937, p. 67-68b.
37) Pelzer [1945: 264] determined that 77,740
Javanese migrated to Lampung between 1938-
1940 whereas the government sponsored about
25,000 pioneers between 1905-1930.
existed in Gedong Tataan in 1930 when officials
voiced their concerns about the inadequacy of
irrigation. 38)
The promotion of widespread dry rice cultiva-
tion as the basis for large scale transmigration
explains Wertheim's shock upon returning in
1956 to Lampung, some 25 years after his initial
tour. Surveying the landscape that had pre-
viously enthralled him, Wertheim [1959: 186]
described the ecological disaster,
. . . as if a swarm of locusts had come upon
the country and left it barren and forbidding.
The deforestation, soil erosion and endless
stretches of alang-alang grass were attributed
by Wertheim's informants to the adoption of
shifting cultivation by the Javanese pioneers.
As Resident Rookmaaker had predicted, they
could adapt to the new environment and after
exhausting the soil on one plot, seek another
parcel of land. However, the heightened com-
petition for land between the Javanese and the
swidden farmers of Lampung relying on an ex-
tensive system of cultivation led to interrup-
tions of the crucial restorative fallow cycle.
As a result, the process ended in a victory
for the tough alang alang grass and ensuing
serious soil erosion. [Wertheim 1959:
186]39)
38) Pelzer [1945: 221] notes that the Dutch had
ambitious plans for eventually extending irriga-
tion to 58,000 to 64,000 ha. , sufficient for an
estimated 83,000 families. However, these esti-
mates may not be reliable as Dutch engineers
had been overly optimistic in the past, leading to
the suspension of transmigration in 1933.
39) Also see Pelzer [1968: 267].
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By shifting the basis of the transmigration
settlements from sawah to dry rice cultivation,
the government promoted extensification rather
than intensification of farming methods. The
problems of the Javanese were less their involu-
tionary behavior than a reflection of the con-
sequences of misguided colonial policies.
III The Debt Cycle
The story of government sponsored trans-
migration is the progressive shifting of the
financial burden onto the shoulders of the hard-
pressed pioneers, cutbacks in irrigation marking
a further step in that direction, and the rapid
rise in indebtedness that came to plague the
transmigration settlements. The origins of this
indebtedness preceded the adoption of the
bawon system, the shift towards dry rice cul-
tivation and the massive surge in migration
between 1932-1940, but investigations into the
state of the pioneer villages published in 1941
attest to the telling impact that the new policy
initiatives had on the transmigrant economy.
In order to understand the essential flaw of
the bawon system as translated in Lampung, it
is useful to consider yet another Javanese tradi-
tion, ijon, the selling of one's crop in advance of
the harvest, usually at a sharply discounted rate
to rice millers. 40) Indebtedness was common in
Lampung's pioneer settlements, largely result-
ing from advances from rice millers. The re-
ports of local colonial officials highlight the role
of ijon in the immiserization of the transmigrant
communities. While indebtedness was not en-
40) See C. B. van der Leeden [1952: 174]. This
dissertation contains a useful discussion of the
detrimental impact of the ijon system on the
pioneers.
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demic among the colonists with good sawah
land and high, relatively stable yields, the new-
er colonists with lesser yields, limited access to
irrigation or cultivating solely on dry fields had a
high incidence of indebtedness. The ubiquitous
system of ijon, a particularly harsh form of
sharecropping wherein the farmer takes all the
risk and the rice millers claim most of the
product, stifled the economic vitality of the
Javanese settlements. True, the Javanese could
count on the Chinese businessmen for neces-
sary credit, but at great economic risk and cost.
Alarmed by the consequences of the ijon sys-
tem, officials expressed concern that many col-
onists lacked zeal due to the perception that
they were merely working to payoff their
debts. 41)
Paradoxically, the magnitude of rice "sur-
pluses" was consistently high and yet the signs
of material prosperity so sporadic. Some
Javanese settlers indeed were doing quite well
in Lampung, but many were not so fortunate.
As the settlements became saturated, the pros-
pects for the second generation of pioneers and
the more recent arrivals dimmed consider-
ably. 42) For many, the opening of Sukadana,
where 2.5 bouws of land was promised, repre-
sented a new beginning and a chance to escape
the debt cycle already swirling through the
overcrowded Gedong Tataan complex. And for
those remaining in Gedong Tataan, a brief sur-
cease until the relentless and manifold problems
of overcrowding resumed. With a birthrate of
41) AGS 519320 Feb. 1926, (1925 Annual Report on
the Javanese Colonies in Lampung), pp.8-9.
42) It is argued that indebtedness was the main
reason why settlers relocated from the older
settlements to the new Sukadana complex [van
der Leeden 1952: 179; Metz and Klomp 1940:
155].
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9.2% reported in Gedong Tataan for 1924,
partially offset by high mortality rates, the ex-
pansion onto adjacent lands and into Sukadana
were ineffective palliatives. 43)
In the context of widespread indebtedness
and the ijon system wherein the pioneers were
obliged to deliver a substantial portion of their
current harvest to service accumulated debts,
the ambivalence evinced by the pioneers to-
wards the bawon system is understandable. 44)
The strain on available resources represented
by new arrivals must have been considerable
and anathema to many. While more padi could
be sown and harvested with the additional
labor, there was an additional claim on the
harvest which could not be recouped as pro-
vided for in the bawon system operating in Java.
After the harvest the new pioneers were relo-
cated to distant areas where there was no
opportunity for the household that employed
them to earn back the bawon shares provided.
In addition, providing room and board during
the harvest season, also at variance with the
bawon system in Java, represented a serious
burden on the precarious financial situation of
the established pioneer families.
It was problematic that the pioneers had no
choice in the matter; supporting new migrants
and their families under the bawon system be-
43) MVO Rookmaaker 1937; MVO Berkhout 1926.
Although health and sanitation improved dramati-
cally in the pioneer settlements, as late as 1937
the death rate was 1. 5 times as great as that
prevailing in Java, a staggering figure when one
recalls that health and youth were two criteria
for selection of recruits.
44) A local Lampung journal expressed sympathy
towards reportedly disaffected Javanese trans-
migrants faced with heavy burdens and limited
opportunities. Lampung Revue Vol. 1 (Feb.,
1931), p. 22.
came an obligation, for sawah owners and
debtors alike. As Boeke [1953: 183] lamented
in a broader context:
. . . the government advertised migration as
though it were a new article for mass con-
sumption which it has just brought on the
market. But every mass consumption article
is subject to standardization, and so was
colonization: each colonist had to be treated
in the same way, must be given the same
amount of land, the same amount of credit.
And so, since each colony must become a
close replica of the original milieu, it was
impossible to avoid the creation of little Java's
wherever land was developed in the Outer
Islands. But in this way Java's population
problem was transplanted, not solved.
While Boeke's logic is compelling, in some re-
spects the bawon system in Lampung differed
from that implemented elsewhere in the Outer
Islands and was generally considered to be
more onerous. While settlers in Palembang did
not have to accept harvesters until their fourth
year, there was only two years grace in Lam-
pungo There was also a difference in the ratio
of harvesting families assigned to "assist"
established settlers with 1: 3 on sawahs and
1: 4 on tegalan (dry fields) in Gedong Tataan,
somewhat less favorable than the 1: 5 ratio on
tega/an in Palembang [Pelzer 1945: 221].45)
The best sawahs in Lampung yielded 40-50
Picols per bouw and each settled family, at least
45) Although there was a heavier burden on sawah
owners, limited indebtedness among them and
higher, more stable yields suggest that their
financial position was relatively less threatened
by the imposition of harvesting families.
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in the beginning, had roughly 1.5 bouws of land
(2.5 bouws in Sukadana). For those lucky
enough to have access to irrigation, the 2 picols
earned by a migrant family represented a re-
latively small portion of the harvest. 46) A family
of four, with access to secondary food crops
such as com and cassava, could subsist on a
minimum of 15 Picols of padi per annum leaving
a "surplus" of some 45 picots. However, based
on a generous price of Fl per picot of rice, it
would cost roughly 50 picots to cover head tax,
desa tax, corvee ransom and other money pay-
ments to the government. 47) This does not
reflect the claims of additional children, accumu-
lated debt nor the estimated F25 of cash needs
for a typical family per annum. 48) Thus, with a
minimum of some F75 in money obligations per
annum against an average total income of F90
for the wealthiest pioneers, the bawon shares
paid out to arriving settlers were burdensome
for sawah owners, although not unduly so ex-
46) Since three sawah owning families supported one
migrant family, each family only contributed one-
third of the average 5 Picols of padi earned under
the bawon system.
47) In 1936 the price of rice averaged FO.65 while in
1937 it rose to Fl. 10. Figures from H. R.
Rookmaaker [1937: 423]. Tax obligations are
drawn from the local newspaper Fadjar
Soematera 5/17/30 #15. An earlier 1927 survey
estimated average tax obligations in Lampung at
F70 per annum, see Verslag van den Belasting-
druk op de Inlandsche Bevolking in de Buiten-
gewesten [1929]. During the Depression (1930-
1933) the government imposed a tax surcharge
which increased the burden in those years.
48) MR 1166, 1932. Figures for rice and cash needs
are based on government estimates of what a
new migrant family would need in its first year.
Taking the government projection that 5 picols
were enough to see the new family through the
initial three to four months yields an annual
estimate of 15-20 picols.
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cept in bad years. 49)
Yet, this was the brightest prospect; families
subsisting on non-irrigated land faced declining
yields, a process accelerated by the more inten-
sive farming associated with the bawon system.
It was estimated that after five harvests, rice
yields on dry land declined to approximately
20-30 picots per bouw, roughly equivalent to
sawah yields in Java [Rookmaaker 1937: 413].
It is worth emphasizing that a majority of new
settlers did not receive irrigated land under the
bawon system and thus the arrival of harvesters
in two years, before they could possibly have
established themselves, accelerated the debt
cycle. For every family in Gedong Tataan earn-
ing more than F90 per year there were nearly
two families earning less than F62, substantially
less than the average estimated cash needs per
year (F75). In this way the colonists became
beholden to the tintah darat (literally land
leeches, but a general derogatory appellation
for Chinese money lenders), borrowing just to
meet minimum obligations, at estimated annual-
ized interest rates of 440%!50)
The government cherished the vision of fuel-
ing transmigration on the basis of Javanese
custom, mobilizing resources from the com-
munity in the name of tradition (and in the
interests of State policy), but could never really
make the system work properly. The govern-
ment did save money and did move vast num-
bers of Javanese, but transmigration did not
provide the basis for any lasting improvement in
49) Income estimates from Henri Fievez de Ma1ines
van Ginkel [1929].
50) For a discussion of the corrosive influence of the
tintah darat and the manner in which they ex-
tracted extremely high levels of interest from
their clients see Fadjar Soematera, 5/17/30 #15.
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their living standard.
Official protestations to the contrary, prob-
lems plagued the bawon system from the out-
set. The government reacted sharply to critic-
ism of its bawon policy, responding to charges
in a series of articles in Bintang Timoer, a
leading daily newspaper in Java, that the
harvesters were thrust upon the pioneers, a
burden which led to their immiserization. 51) In
the first year of the bawon system of migration,
1,000 settlers were relocated in October, 1932,
well after the harvest, and Resident Junius
judged it necessary to request government
assistance to support them for the 165 days
before the April rice harvest. The resident was
upbraided for not hewing to the new govern-
ment orientation and was told that financial
assistance was unnecessary as the new arrivals
could subsist on secondary crops that estab-
lished settlers would willingly provide them. In
addition, there was concern that if the govern-
ment helped the pioneers every time calamity
threatened, this would sap their vitality and
foster dependency. Eventually the government
did provide support for one-seventh of the new
arrivals, but only for those located in the new
Sukadana comple which had no core of estab-
lished settlers to provide assistance. 52) Later
51) MR 1166, 1932 mentions that there are a num-
ber of critical articles about government trans-
migration policy, citing Bintang Timoer May 29,
30, 31, 1931, but I was not able to locate the
articles in question. In Bintang Timoer 6/22/32
#129 there is a lengthy discussion between the
editors of B. T. and C. C. J. Maassen about the
merits and problems of transmigration with re-
ference to the bawon system. For additional
critical commentary about transmigration see
Bintang Timoer, 3/3/32, #51; 4/26/32, #95;
6/7/32, #129.
52) MR 1317, 1932.
on, the government increasingly provided new
transmigrants with rice advances to tide them
over until their first harvest.
While the generally smooth functioning of the
transport system is a tribute to Dutch orderli-
ness, the pressures of moving so many
thousands in a 4-6 week period inevitably
caused bottlenecks. If the harvesters arrived
after the harvest, the subsequently more le-
nient administrators advanced them the equiva-
lent in rice that they would have earned as
harvesters. However, from the settlers' point
of view there was a considerable difference;
rather than earning his initial rice he immedi-
ately became indebted and yet another claim
accumulated on the forthcoming harvest. By
1940 the bawon system had broken down to
such an extent that 2,292 of the 7,500 families
settled in that year received their rice entirely
on credit rather than earning it through bawon
[Pelzer 1945: 221].
The shortcomings of the bawon system are
also evident in the general recognition that
earnings therefrom were insufficient to support
the colonists in the initial few months, compel-
ling many to seek wage labor from the
outset. 53) Maassen worried, however, that
while there were sufficient work opportunities
for the settlers at the time he was writing in
1937, there was uncertainty that such opportu-
nities for wage employment on plantations
would be available in sufficient numbers in the
future to underwrite the costs of transmigra-
53) Fadjar Soematera 4/5/30, #5 notes the increas-
ing reliance of the plantations on the nearby
transmigrant settlements, comparing the daily
trek of an estimated 2,300 colonists to estates to
a file of ants, lamenting the drudgery and mono-
tony of the Javanese settlers' lives.
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tion. In his view it was wiser to provide more
land to each settler, permit cash crop produc-
tion and in that way stimulate labor demand
within the settlements. Given the pressures to
move as many as possible quickly and cheaply,
however, he admitted how there was little
chance for implementation of such a sensible
plan [Maassen 1938-39: 188].
While the colonists tried to make ends meet
by engaging in wage labor on the estates and
with the smallholders, the gap was only partially
closed and as noted above, they frequently
became prey to the tintah darat and rice
millers. In 1936 former Assistant Resident
Zwaal deplored the pervasive incidence of in-
debtedness and took the government to task for
failing to provide alternative sources of credit as
existed throughout Java [Zwaal 1936a: 213].
Significantly, Zwaal's observations came on the
heels of limited bawon based migration involving
only 15,000 Javanese. The wave of 85,000
transmigrants that followed between 1936-
1941 exacerbated this desperate state of affairs.
While the state of the older colonies was
precarious, the situation confronting the new
settlers in Sukadana was, in some respects,
decidedly worse. They did receive more land if
they could clear it, but this was easier said than
done. 54) In the first year the settlers were able
to clear a half bouw and from this produce some
54) There is some confusion as to how much land
was made available to the settlers in Sukadana.
Rookmaaker says they received 1.25 bouws, Pel-
zer suggests a figure of 1 bouw of irrigable land,
presumably in addition to an erfparcel, while the
Central Colonization Committee indicates t.hat
settlers received a minimum of 2.5 bouws and a
maximum of 5 bouws. MVO Rookmaaker 1937,
p. 10; Pelzer [1945: 221]; MR 1166, 1932; MR
878, 1932.
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twenty picots of rice, at least one-half of which
went to pay debts [Rookmaaker 1937: 419].
Under such circumstances, it is not clear how
the new migrant families were able to establish
themselves in two years to a degree sufficient
to also provide room and board for an incoming
family. With the thin margin upon which the
pioneers lived, even supplemented by wage
labor, the arrival of harvesters was certainly a
mixed blessing, leading to a brisk business for
the money lenders.
The new migrants were exempt from taxes
and corvee (forced labor) in their initial three
years, but they faced a number of other heavy
demands. After 1935 all pioneers had to reim-
burse the government for their transport ex-
penses (FI2.50) and household tools and uten-
sils (FI0-12), were obliged to accept a new
migrant family within two years of arrival and,
in Sukadana alone, had to perform unpaid labor
in the construction of irrigation canals totaling
seventy-five days in the first three years in
addition to various tasks in their villages. 55) To
the extent that labor had to be diverted from
the clearing of fields, less land was available for
cultivation. Prior to the imposition of the irriga-
tion construction obligation, colonists typically
cleared one-half bouw in the first year; taking
account of the irrigation construction demands it
would take at least three years for a pioneer
family to clear the entire parcel. The arrival of
new migrants after only two years· perhaps
hastened clearing the parcel, but also placed a
greater drain on the smaller area cleared and
sown prior to their arrival.
Ironically, for the 12,000 transmigrant fami-
55) Irrigation work broke down to 15, 30, 30 days in
the first three years.
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lies in Sukadana, the average sawah holding per
household was less than the average reported
by De Vries in 1937 for Java. 56) In all of
Lampung, with a 1940 population of 173, 959
Javanese pioneers, there was only 11,993
bouws of sawah [Sjamsu 1960: 9-11]. Clearly
the situation in Lampung had rapidly deterio-
rated under the pressures of rapid, ill-prepared
migration and land pressures in the transmig-
rant settlements were on a par with Java. The
problems of insufficient irrigation had grown
exponentially since van der Zwaal's warning six
years previous as had the extent of indebted-
ness.
The severity of indebtedness emerges from
the Volkscredietwezen's (People's Credit Ser-
vice) investigation into overall indebtedness in
Lampung's pioneer settlements published in
1941 [Soekasno 1941].
Soekasno, who completed a number of other
studies on credit problems in Java, undertook
an investigation into the situation of the
Javanese pioneers between 1938-1940 in Lam-
pungo His study features the central problem of
indebtedness among the pioneers and the
deep roots of the ijon system. Significantly,
Soekasno asserted that a majority of the
Javanese were in a state of permanent indebted-
ness. Most severely hit were the oldest desas,
reflected in the movement by many of their
residents to the new colony of Sukadana. 57) In
the older desas of Gedong Tataan, the steady
56) H. R. Rookmaaker [1937: 419] cites E. De
Vries article "Economie de Desa" in Java Bode,
which gives an estimate of .33 ha. of sawah and
.38 ha. of unirrigated land for the average house-
hold in Java, ca. 1936. There are no figures for
number of families and the assumption that each
family consisted of only four members is prob-
ably somewhat low, but remains indicative.
erosion of living standards accompanying the
fragmentation of land, rising landlessness and
overpopulation, were reflected in lower rice
consumption as many subsisted on secondary
crops and sold their rice to service debts
[Maassen 1937: 159-160, 173-175]. Since
the farmers had borrowed against future har-
vests they were not able to extend help to
new migrants without incurring further debts.
It was the advance system that ensured the rice
mills their rice and the peasants their peonage.
In 1938 Soekasno reports that 32% of the
colonists of Gedong Tataan had no sawah,
reflecting the absence of irrigable land and in-
dicating the cause of growing penury. Of those
fortunate enough to own a sawah, conditions
were only slightly better as 73% owned less
than one bouw [Soekasno 1941]. Moreover,
fragmentation of land was proceeding apace as
the average size of land holdings in Gedong
Tataan declined 1.53% per annum between
1937-1940 roughly equivalent to the per annum
average decline registered in Java (1.52%) be-
tween 1930-1940 [van der Leeden 1952: 168].
By the outbreak of WWII, the average house-
hold's landholding in Java and Madura was .17
ha. , marginally smaller than the .23 ha. re-
corded for Gedong Tataan [Brand 1949: 32].
Truly the government had created a "stukje" of
Java in Lampung, but hardly in the sense they
intended.
Prior to WWII the situation in the Sukadana
complex had not yet shown such strains, but it
was only a matter of time before the same
problems engulfed these Javanese pioneers as
well. From the outset, land scarcity was cre-
57) In 1937 Resident Rookmaaker also noted the
rather more severe debt situation in the older
desas. MVO Rookmaaker 1937, p. 45.
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ated by government edict; by moving 47,000
people into Sukadana without adequate prepara-
tion, irrigation and support, the elements of
stagnation were in place. Van der Leeden
[1952: 166] points out that in the Sukadana
complex, the density of pioneers to area of
cultivated land (including garden plots) was 513
per km2., approaching levels in Java. 58) In his
opinion, by basing emigration on Javanese social
organization, adapting the same intensive fann-
ing techniques as in Java and faced with such an
alanning level of overpopulation, the portents
were clear. Further undermining the settle-
ments was the reliance on dry rice cultivation
and lack of irrigation. Ironically, the Dutch had
out "involutionized" the Javanese.
Recognizing indebtedness as the achilles heel
of the pioneer settlements, van der Leeden
developed an argument explaining the reasons
for the plight of the Javanese that reveals more
about colonial attitudes than the processes of
immiserization. Following Soekasno, van der
Leeden [1952: 165] explains how outlandish
consumption patterns on the part of the
Javanese explain, in large measure, their indebt-
edness. Long repressed desires and the easy
availability of credit, in the form of advances,
led to splurges and festivals far in excess of the
norm in Java; better clothing, housing and diet
characterized the "noveau riche" Javanese
pioneers. The high degree of "social wants" of
the Javanese prevented accumulation of capital,
a situation which he maintained is prevalent
among poor people around the world as soon as
they are freed from their subsistence exis-
58) For an excellent brief discussion ofJava's popula-
tion dilemma see W. Brand [1949: 28-40].
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tence. 59)
Indebtedness, then, was due to the, ". . .
not rationally motivated, bizarre. . ." [van der
Leeden 1952: 165], consumption patterns of
the Javanese. It is in this context that van der
Leeden argues that it is essential that the gov-
ernment maintain active participation in the
transmigration scheme to protect the Javanese
from themselves.
The lackluster results of transmigration,
according to Dutch officials, was also due to
poor selection procedures; fully 30% of the
recruits in 1939 were reportedly of "poor quali-
ty" [Pelzer 1945: 251]. This even after the
publication of the ten commandments of trans-
migration and the emphasis on good selection
criteria [Pelzer 1945: 209-210]. In the Dutch
view, these pioneers were bad elements in the
villages from whence they migrated, explaining
their poor showing as pioneers.
IV Conclusion
It is interesting that the problem of Javanese
transmigrant communities is largely conceived
in terms of their shortcomings. Whether it be
bizarre and outlandish consumption patterns,
involutionary behavior or merely bad eggs, the
Javanese are deemed responsible for the
"stagnation" or poverty that characterizes the
pioneer settlements. While the attitudes and
attributes of the Javanese may have contributed
to the problems plaguing the "little Javas" in
Lampung, it is important not to overlook the
underlying problems of Dutch transmigration
59) Van der Leeden was a student of J. H. Boeke
and the notion of social needs is central to his
thesis about economic dualism. See Indonesian
Economics [1961: 8-14].
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policy. As Jan Breman [1983: 2], has noted
with regard to colonial policies in Java,
A broader analytical scope is also necessary
in view of the fact that official reports blamed
the origin of such abuses largely on over-
population, on the non-economic behavior of
the peasants, on Chinese merchants, and
moneylenders who were considered to be a
malignant element, and on corrupt village
administrations. In essence, this meant that
the cause of the trouble was considered to be
the way in which the peasantry reacted to
colonial policy itself. (emphasis added)
The Dutch tried to mobilize support and in-
volvement in their transmigration efforts by
constructing and manipulating traditional institu-
tions, leaders and relationships, but the re-
sponse was ambivalent. As traditional practices
such as bawon or gotong royong were transmit-
ted through the bureaucratic prism they
assumed an artificial discreteness, a rigid and
hybrid character at odds with customary
practices; as a prism isolates light into discrete
bands of color, the Dutch selected certain cus-
tomary practices and isolated various useful
aspects. In detaching, altering and exaggerating
these particular elements of traditional practices
which only had meaning as interrelated ele-
ments of cultural and social practices, however,
these constructs became alienated from the
community. In this sense gotong royong lost its
connotation of mutual assistance and as a dis-
torted cultural construct came to serve as
ideological justification for mobilizing assistance
to the State [Bowen 1986: 548].
More fundamentally, as Dutch financial sup-
port declined over the years, especially after
the introduction of the bawon system, rising
indebtedness undermined the pioneers' efforts.
After 1932, when the government sponsored
mass migration largely at the pioneers' ex-
pense, it artificially recreated within a few years
the very population problems that had wreaked
havoc in Java and gave impetus, in the words of
Boeke, to the "noodlottige cirkelgang" (fatal
debt cycle). Even had the government success-
fully created widespread irrigation, the prob-
lems of overpopulation would certainly have
arisen because in their haste to alleviate Java's
population problem they flooded Lampung with
scant regard for the consequences. However,
by tr~splanting a population density to Lam-
pung approaching levels in Java without the
concomitant introduction of sawah cultivation,
the Dutch created the basis for lasting stagna-
tion. The fatal debt cycle had claimed many
victims prior to the Depression, but with the
advent of mass migration based on a hybrid
bawon system, reflecting more the govern-
ment's desire to save money rather than the
original custom, it gained momentum with tell-
ing effect. As on Java, the problem was too
many people on too little land, weighed down
with high levels of indebtedness. In trying to
respond to the plight of the Javanese during the
Great Depression, Dutch officials were ham-
pered by the need for strict economies; there
was a need for solutions entailing minimal out-
lays. Thus, the Dutch articulated their trans-
migration policy in the idiom of the Javanese
paradigm, unwittingly reproducing it intact,
warts and all.
The flaw of transmigration was less in
Javanese attitudes than in those of the colonial
overlords. The adaptation of the Javanese to
poverty in Java led the government to imple-
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ment transmigration on a minimum subsistence
basis with no room for economic advancement
and great risk of permanent indebtedness. 60)
Perhaps these are the roots of the "involution-
ary behavior" now apparent, a legacy of poorly
conceived and implemented state initiatives.
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